"The NHS will last as long as there are folk left with the faith to fight for it"
Aneurin Bevan

Monday, 19 September 2011

Private Patient Income Cap

NHS hospitals treat private patients. When Parliament were discussing the bill to create Foundation Trusts there was a rebellion from Labour MPs and so the Labour government agreed to place a cap on how much private income an NHS acute hospital can receive from private income (Private Patient Income or PPI). This cap was arbitrary: FTs were limited to the percentage of their income that came from private work in 2003.

When a trust is authorised as an FT it must agree not to exceed this cap. If it does, then the FT is in breach of its authorisation and can be de-authorised and return to being an NHS Trust. Mental health FTs are covered by different rules: the Health Act 2009 says that the proportion of income derived from private patients is capped to the greater of either the private income in 2003, or 1.5%. For example, in 2010/11 two FTs were in breach of their PPI cap: Basildon and Thurrock University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust and Liverpool Women's NHS Foundation Trust. Monitor has agreed an action plan with these trusts.

So what is "private patient income"? This does not necessarily mean private patients because it includes services. So if an FT provides some pathology services to a private hospital that income counts as part of the PPI. In addition, according to Monitor's compliance rules, FTs can form partnerships with the private sector companies, and this has resulted in several FTs creating Private Patient Units (PPUs). An example of this is The Christie in Manchester which provides The Christie Clinic in partnership with HCA International. HCA (the parent company) is the largest for-profit healthcare company in the US. It also has the dubious distinction of paying the largest fraud settlement in US history when, in 2002, it paid more than $2 billion in civil law suits.

In 2010/11 FTs generated £252m income from private patients, from a total income of £26,867m (ie 1.1% up from 1.0% in 2009/10; figures from Monitor). This implies that FTs generate very little from private patients. However, there are some anomalies that bump up the PPI from FTs:

The Royal Marsden 30.7%
Royal Brompton and Harefield 14.4%
Moorfields Eye Hospital 13.7%
University College London Hospitals   6.6%
Papworth Hospital  6.1%
Guy's & St Thomas'  3.0%


The Health Bill that is just about to go to the House of Lords abolishes NHS Trusts, so the threat of d-authorisation will be pointless: all NHS Trusts will have to become FTs. The Bill also revokes the PPI cap. This means that Foundation Trusts will be no limit to how much income the trust will be able to generate from private patients.


So who are the private patients? Some patients will be foreigners travelling to the UK although as I have pointed out before, Deloitte does not mention the UK as a destination for US healthcare tourism. Moorfields Eye Hospital even has a hospital in Dubai. Approximately 20% of all healthcare spend in the UK is on private treatments so clearly there are people who prefer to pay for treatment that they could get on the NHS.

The supporters of the Bill say that private patients will bring in more money into FTs and this will provide a subsidy to NHS patients. However, PPI is unlikely to make a difference in most trusts because the income will be low. the downside of private patients is that it reinforces a two-tier NHS. A private patient will not want to be on an NHS waiting list, nor wait in a queue in a waiting room, nor have the same accommodation as an NHS patient. If they had money to give away and still wanted to be treated the same as an NHS patient, they would simply make a charity donation to the hospital. No, private patients want to get something for their money and that something is to jump queues and get better accommodation.

The following is a tweet from Dave West from HSJ, reporting from the Lib Dem conference.


What this says is that Shirley Williams is suggesting that the PPI cap should not be removed, instead it should be altered. She is suggesting that the arbitrary cap set at the level of PPI a trust generated in 2003 should be changed so that a trust cannot generate more than 50% of its income from PPI.

This is a typical pointless Lib Dem fudge. This PPI cap will have no effect on the majority of FTs. In 2010/11 FTs income was £27bn it is extremely unlikely that there is £13bn cash sloshing around in patients' pockets to pay for private treatment in NHS hospitals, so the 50% cap will only affect a few hospitals, and most likely the six listed above. Is it likely that The Royal Marsden will increase its PPI from 30.6% to 49.9%? There's very little chance of that. So the proposed amendment will have little effect at all.

I have never rated Baroness Williams as being capable of making the Health Bill better, and this suggestion reinforces my opinion. The Baroness could suggest an arbitrary cap of, for example, 30% (or maybe even lower, say 10%). This would give a clear indication that NHS Foundation Trusts should concentrate on NHS work. A lower cap, forcing the few outliers to divest themselves of some of their private patients, will give a clear signal. Setting the PPI cap at 50% basically says that the Baroness likes the idea of a two tier system where the same hospital treats patients differently depending on whether they are able to pay.

The Baroness could even suggest something cleverer and still stick to Lib Dem principles of equity. For example, the PPI cap could be in two parts: treating patients and providing services (for example pathology). The PPI on patient income could be set low (say 5% or 10%) to give a clear message that the NHS is about equity, and restrict the formation of a two-tier system; but the services PPI could be set high to encourage FTs to generate income from private hospitals other than from patients. The rules will have to be strict that services for NHS patients take precedence. If the intention is for NHS hospitals to be innovative, then they should use patent laws and licence private hospitals (but not NHS hospitals, there should be some benefits to be "in the NHS family") to use the techniques they developed and this income could come under the "services PPI".

UPDATE:
Andy Cowper at Health Policy Insight reports Simon Hughes interviewed by Andrew Neil on BBC2's Daily Politics saying that 
"there's a lot of work still to do on the Bill ... it's by no means over ... there are three of four significant things still to be done ... we need to absolutely tie down that private work in any NHS hospital cannot become the dominant activity or the driver"
(my emphasis). This is the 50% PPI cap being trailed. If a hospital does less private work than 50% of its income, then it cannot be "dominant", right?

Friday, 16 September 2011

Corrigan's dumbing down of patients to close hospitals

Paul Corrigan writes today in a pamphlet for the right wing think tank Reform that the hospital is dead. Corrigan is one of the architects of the Blairite NHS Planwith the underlying aim to privatise the NHS and so it is fitting that his pamphlet is published by the pro-market think tank Reform.

Corrigan's thesis is that about 70% of NHS funds are spent on patients with long term conditions and that hospitals are not designed to deal with those conditions. Hospitals fix illnesses and do not manage long term conditions. Or so he thinks. He then gives some free market mumbo jumbo to say that primary care is not good at long term conditions either:
The funding structure of the NHS has been constructed so that the GP practices do not get rewarded for providing efficient, preventative services to the patients. Rather, the payments are received by the hospitals as the patients become sicker. Consequently, in this type of healthcare system, there is a larger incentive to admit patients rather than to avoid admissions.
Corrigan clearly thinks the entire NHS top-to-bottom is not fit for purpose.

If a GP needs to have a financial incentive to treat his/her patients properly then s/he is a poor GP and should not be in the job. The incentive for the GP is to achieve a patient who can manage their condition effectively; just that. The same could be said of hospitals, but remember, the payment by results system that Corrigan criticises was introduced by the team he was a part of. Is he saying that he was wrong? I do not see a mea culpa in the pamphlet.

Corrigan argues that up to 40 hospitals will have to close in the next few years because he says that the care of long term conditions should be moved to "the community". This is the buzzword at the moment, yet no one seems able to say where this "community" is nor where the funding comes from to make the move. While there may be savings in moving care to "the community" (I do not know if this is the case) it certainly involves investment to make the move.

For example, a GP doctorpreneur in my area has decided that his new company is "the community" where treatment must be moved to, and he has decided to set up a primary care clinic. The clinic will replace his own GP clinic (so far, so good) and a community hospital which is run by the local hospital and is out of his control (so is unlikely to close). The new clinic will cost £10m with neither the doctorpreneur nor the local PCT (nor, indeed, anyone else) with any clue where the money will come from. The local hospital has an annual budget of £170m (which includes community health services) with an annual capital budget far smaller than £10m, and a long list of more important things to spend the money on. I will leave it up to the reader to think where the funding will come from and who, in the future, will control healthcare in that community in the future. (Hint: it will not be the NHS, nor anything the community controls.)

Corrigan also puts a lot of confidence in telehealth.

Telehealth ensures remotes delivery of care to patients, usually with long term conditions, in their own homes. The use of telecommunications and other computer-based systems make remote medical care possible. ... Telehealth is primarily used for diagnosis but has also been regularly used in monitoring various conditions related to the conditions of the patients. Recorded data or real-time images are used for clinical inspection which may be required for prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of a disease.
This is all very good as long as the the telehealth makes a difference. I am not sure it will. The problem is that it involves putting expensive kit in people's home, or more likely, expecting them to pay for it. Is this a good use of resources? Will it give better care to the more affluent and better educated and put the less well off and less well educated at a disadvantage and increase health inequalities?

Corrigan uses the example of one long term condition - diabetes - to support his thesis. I have some knowledge in the area since I have had type 1 diabetes for 35 years. Diabetics use blood glucose meters (Corrigan calls them glucometers) that cost about £25 and use test strips that cost about 50p each. The strips are available on prescription but the patient usually buys the meter, or more often, gets the meter free from the manufacturer on the Gillette razor blade theory (they give away the handles because they make a big profit on the blades, you just have to make the customer choose to use the blades). Currently diabetics use the most complex computer in the world to interpret the results from the glucose meter: their own brain. They record these results and then periodically use an equally complex, but slightly more expensive computer: their clinician's (GP or diabetologist) brain. The second computer is actually used for reassurance, and to make periodic changes, there is no need for the clinician to be consulted more often than three or four times a year (if that often) since it is the first computer (them!) that does most of the work.

Both of these computers (the patient and the clinician) needs to be trained and occasionally re-trained. But once a patient understands how to treat their condition, they can - and should - be allowed to manage it themselves. The patient is far better to be able to manage their care, for the simple reason that the patient has all the data at the exact time the blood glucose test is made, and the clinician doesn't. Diabetes is a balance between insulin injections (and or other drugs), carbohydrate and exercise. There are other factors too, like general wellbeing (a cold will raise blood sugar) and other factors which I know affects my blood sugar that no one can explain (the change from spring to summer lowers my blood sugar, and the change from summer to autumn raises it, yet I do not eat differently nor take different amounts of exercise; when my father died, for six months afterwards I needed 25% less insulin, yet I ate and exercised the same).

A patient with a long term condition has expert knowledge, the clinician reinforces, but must not replace this knowledge. Corrigan disagrees:

However, many hospitals and clinicians recognise this and have started to consider care beyond the hospital walls through the effective use of telehealth. At the Ulster Hospital in Dundonald, diabetes management was tackled by Dr Roy Harper in 2009. The aim was to empower patients to become better self-managers of their diabetes through education and self-management and to efficiently titrate patients just starting on insulin to achieve optimal blood sugar control. Patients were trained to use the monitors including their glucometer and all readings are transmitted. Nurses carry out a triaging process and escalate patients according to protocols designed with the specialist nursing team. Virtual clinics are held to review patients who require extra support or a change in medication. The team is able to review real time data without the need for a hospital visit by the patient or a home visit by a community nurse.
What Corrigan is suggesting is dis-empowering patients. Rather than the patient manageing their own condition by using their expert knowledge of how much they have eaten, how much exercise they have taken and how well they feel to interpret their glucose reading and to determine their insulin dose, he is suggesting that the responsibility should go to a remote nurse who only has a fraction of the information: the blood sugar readings. This is day-to-day monitoring that dumbs-down the most important part: the patient.

Corrigan touches on the actual solution to managing long term conditions: "education and self-management".  This is the vital part: diabetics need to have periodic intensive education under clinical supervision so that they can experience getting their management wrong as well as how to get it right. This is something that should be done in a clinical setting - in a hospital - and not at home. Once educated the patient then needs minimal monitoring by a doctor. However, long term checks - like HbA1c, retina monitoring, and checks on the feet - are things that must be carried out and interpreted by a clinician and cannot be done by the patient. I would also say that periodically - perhaps every ten years - a diabetic's computer need a reboot. They should go through the whole process of re-training all over again as if they were newly diagnosed. This is not just to teach them to manage their condition according to the more up to date methods (and get them out of bad habits) but also to ensure that the newer drugs they are using are used effectively and not merely as a replacement for the older drugs they were used to. Again, this has to be done under clinical supervision in a hospital.

Corrigan is not advocating this type of care - a form of co-production with their care team - instead he is advocating that the patient becomes completely subservient and dis-empowered and that the doctorpreneur "in the community" has the control.

Nope, sorry, I do not agree. I far more prefer to see a diabetic consultant to ensure that my computer - my brain -is up to date, and monitoring that I am unable to do, by my GP.

Wednesday, 14 September 2011

Representative

Here's some figures, it's fun to compare and to try to interpret them.

First up, the British Attitudes Survey. Every year they publish results of a survey question asking what party the respondent most identifies with. Here are the results from the 2010 survey showing how the value has changed over the last 25 years:

For the last date (2008) the results are:

Cons 32%
Lab 26%
LD 9%
Other 6%
None 25%

These suggest that the country is quite Conservative, about a third of people "identify with" the Tories. The interesting figure is "None", that is, the people who do not want to vote and are not interested. Look at how this figure has grown since about 1994: over the last two decades people have got more turned off from politics. If I was running a political party it would be these people I would target.

Now have a look at the results from the 2010 General Election:

% MPs% Vote
Cons 47%32%
Lab 40%35%
LD 9%22%
Other 5%10%
None

In terms of the number of MPs, Other and Liberal Democrats are similar to the BAS scores, but look at the value for the Tories and Labour. Since we do not have a "none-of-the-above" option on ballot papers it looks like the people who have no affiliation have given equal weights to Tories and Labour (bumping the Tory 32% "identity" to a value of 47% of MPs). Of course, individuals vote rather than select MPs, and the share of the vote shows the Tories at the BAS level and Labour, and in particular, Lib Dems, getting a boost from the lack of a "none-of-the-above" option.

I know that the number of MPs reflects the oddities of the first-past-the-post voting system, but even so-called "proportional" systems produce odd results. The election before the 2010 General Election was the 2009 Euro-elections. The results were:

% MEPs% Vote
Cons 37%28%
Lab 19%16%
LD 16%14%
Other 28%42%
None

The Euro-elections are based on the d'Hondt party list system where there are 11 regions (plus Northern Ireland) and each region returns between 4 and 10 MEPs with each party getting a proportion of MEPs according to the proportion of the popular vote the party gets in the region (Northern Ireland is an exception because it uses STV). The results above are for mainland UK (excluding NI). The Tory percentage of MEPs is 5% more than the BAS value and the Labour number of MEPs is 7% less than BAS. The LD number of MEPs is 7% more than BAS.

The large "Other" value is due to UKIP and BNP votes which are significant in Euro-elections, but not in other elections.

Now look at the political affiliations in the House of Lords, here compared with the BAS score:

% LordsBAS
Cons 28%32%
Lab 31%26%
LD 12%9%
Other 4%6%
None 23%25%

The House of Lords is unusual in that it has a "none-of-the-above" component that call themselves crossbenchers (I have listed these in the None row). It is interesting that within a few %age points the three main parties have Lords equivalent to their BAS score. But significantly, the Other and None figures are similar to the BAS scores.

Does this mean that the House of Lords is more representative of the population than elected bodies?

Sunday, 11 September 2011

Simon Jenkins is wrong about everything

There is a general aphorism that "Simon Jenkins is wrong about everything". On Friday he was a guest on BBC Radio 4 Any Questions. When the inevitable NHS reforms question came up he gave a characteristically ill informed answer (43m 45s). He said:

The NHS has been re-organised countless times in the last 20 years and every time  it has proved unsatisfactory. ... the reason is that when it has been re-organised it has been re-centralised.
Well, yes, there have been countless re-organisations, but he has not been paying attention if he thinks each organisation has been centralising. The creation of SHAs and PCTs localised decision making. The original twenty SHAs were devolved responsibilities from the Department of Health and similarly the 300 original PCTs received some responsibilities that had been central. The new Bill does the opposite, it takes the work of the current ten SHAs and centralises it into the four regional arms of the National Commissioning Board and these regional arms will take a quarter of the commissioning that is currently done by PCTs. The current Bill is a centralising bill.

Jenkins continues:

the health systems that appear to work are where the government pays but does not organise, ... for instance Denmark. There the counties run the hospitals ... in effect the counties run the health service.
He is five years out of date and even five years ago he was wrong. Denmark used to have 14 counties and with a population of 5.5m that means an average of 400k per county. The median size of PCTs in the UK is 290K, so our system is more localised than the Danish county system. However, in 2007 the system was re-organised replacing the 14 counties with five regions and so each region covers about a million people. Compare that with the 290k that our PCTs, before the reforms, cover. I suspect that Jenkins was getting confused between Danish counties and English counties, so to give the comparison: our PCTs are more or less a third the size of an English county (there are 150 PCTs and 50 counties or metropolitan areas). Under Lansley's plans public health (vaccination, action against smoking, obesity, teen pregnancy etc, will be carried out by English counties, this is yet another centralisation).

As a consequence of Lansley's disastrous mishandling of the system, the PCTs are coalescing into "clusters" each of which is roughly the size of the Danish regions (about a million people). So for a brief time we will look something like the Danish system, that is until the 300 or so Clinical Commissioning Groups take over. International studies show that smaller commissioning groups are financially unsustainable and are unable to commission effectively. Civitas, for example, present evidence that commissioning groups should cover populations no less than 300k (close to the size of PCTs); the BMA give a higher figure of 500k for the smallest size of an effective commissioning group.


However, it is interesting to compare the Danish system with the NHS. There is a fabulous facility called the European Health Observatory provided by WHO and the following uses facts from their health system profile of the Danish system.

Denmark is much smaller than England at 5.5m (about the population of Scotland which would have been a better comparison for Jenkins to make). OECD says that the Danes pay about a third more than us for their healthcare (UK: 9.8% GDP, $3287; Denmark: 11.5% GDP, $4348). EHO say that most of this money is "earmarked proportional taxation" at the national level which is then redistributed to the five regions via block grants based on social and demographic indicators. This is very similar to England where parliament (the Chancellor) determines how much the NHS will get and the money is then distributed to PCTs using block grants based on population size, demographics and deprivation levels (the contribution for deprivation levels is being cut by the current government).

In 2007 there was a reform that changed control from the 14 counties to five regions. So that means the control of local healthcare is for a body that covers about 1 million people.
Median population covered by a PCT is 164K, so about half a Danish county or one eighth a Danish region. Hence PCTs provide a more localised service. Would it make any difference if local healthcare in England was coordinated through county bodies rather than PCTs? 

In Denmark, GPs are private practice (not employed by the state) paid by capitation (a fixed amount per registered patient) and fee-for-service (for example, paid a fee per vaccination) - much like UK. Regions control the number and location of GPs. In England this work - the commissioning of GPs - is carried out by PCTs, but under Lansley's reform it will be centralised and carried out by the new quango the National Commissioning Board through its "regional arms" (four of them, covering between 10m and 15m people). In Denmark, GP's fees and working conditions are negotiated centrally - just like us. Access to primary care is free-at-the-point-of-use, just like the NHS. There is an option (about 2% of patients) to use any private GPs for an extra payment and such patients do not need to get a GP referral to see a specialist (much like private healthcare in the UK). Private healthcare in Denmark is not regulated.

Danish hospitals are owned and run by the regions, in England we moved to a system where the government owned NHS hospitals became NHS trusts, and in the late 90s NHS trusts became accountable to the local Strategic Health Authority. There were twenty SHAs, each covering about 2.5m people (compare this to Denmark where each region covers about 1.4m). SHAs were re-organised in 2006, so there are now ten (covering about 5m each). However, about half of hospitals are Foundation Trusts which means that they are autonomous and are not accountable to the SHA: the SHA does not "run" them. So compare the Danish centralised system where a central organisation (region) runs the hospitals to Foundation Trusts where they run themselves. (Again, Jenkins is wrong.)

There was a reform in Denmark 1993 to allow patients to be treated anywhere in the country (5-10% of patients take this option). The NHS had a similar reform in 2006, initially to cover specific private facilities (Independent Sector Treatment Centres) but tightened when Andy Burnham became the Secretary of State (to make the NHS the "preferred provider"). In Denmark private hospitals are less than 1% of provision. The Danes have co-payments for dentistry, physiotherapy, spectacles and pharmaceuticals. In the UK we call these "NHS charges", so in other words, the Danish system is very similar to the NHS.

One of the most significant thing about the Danish system is that there was very little change until 1970 when there were reforms to create the current system. There were some changes in 1993 to give patient choice (not significant, and largely used by the affluent and better educated, ie not equitable) and then again in 2007 when the system was re-organised from county based (14) to region based (5).

Frankly Simon Jenkins did not know what he was talking about. The Danish system has more similarities to the system we had in the 1980s before the Internal Market was introduced than to what the current government is proposing. The aphorism "Simon Jenkins is wrong about everything" is yet again upheld.

Saturday, 10 September 2011

The nonsense that is "cutting admin"

Are there too many managers in the NHS? I don't know, and I have never seen one iota of evidence to suggest that there are too many. The reason why the Conservatives went into the 2010 election saying that they would "cut administration by a third" is simply a gut feeling from Lansley. A political gut feeling. Lansley sensed that the Daily Mail brigade had decided that there was too much administration and as an election ploy he made his pledge to them.

The problem is that the majority of the "administration" that the these armchair auditors were complaining about was in hospitals, and Lansley cannot do a thing about administration in Foundation Trust hospitals because FTs are autonomous and are not run by the Department of Health. The only part of the health service that Lansley could change was Strategic Health Authorities and Primary Care Trusts, and so to meet his gut feeling, one third cut he had no option other than to sack the lot of them by abolishing the organisations. That is a big upheaval based on no evidence at all. (PCTs could well be over-managed, but we have no evidence of this, and no evidence if it is as high, or as low as one third too many. It could even be that PCTs are under-managed.)

All of that is politics and should have been pointed out at the election or afterwards, but it wasn't.

So now the civil servants in the Department of Health are implementing the policy. Government departments have to provide an Impact Assessment document indicating the effects of the policy. The government have just produced an IA for the Health and Social Care (Recommitted) Bill and over the next few days I'll post (or tweet) some items from it. My initial reading is that it is not a dispassionate, neutral civil servant document, instead it is a political document and could easily have come straight out of Conservative HQ. It justifies the policy rather than assessing the impact of the policy. (However, I have yet to read it in detail.)

Let's start with the original IA that was produced when the Bill was first published in January. Here is one example (and there are plenty more in that document) that indicates that this document is largely useless and highly political. The following figures have been updated in the more recent IA but I am giving them to illustrate another point (so if you want the more recent figures - I hesitate to use the term "more accurate" - then you should read the more recent version).

To be able to "cut administration by a third" the civil servants first have to determine how much administration there is. Table A1 says that PCT commissioning costs are £3.59bn (the document also notes that SHAs do very little commissioning so the majority of costs come from PCTs).

The following is Table A2 from the IA document that lists the "savings" that will be made (click on it to see it full size). You can see the £3.59bn in the top left hand corner, and below that the £353m commissioning costs from SHAs. These are "real terms figures" but the table assumes that the same amount of commissioning will be needed over the next ten years (bizarre, because as everyone keeps telling us, there are increasing demands due to the ageing population and new treatments, so it is not a good assumption to make that the amount of commissioning will remain the same for ten years).


The "Real commissioning budget" line takes the idea that administration must be cut by one third by 2014/15, so the figure of £2.63bn in the 2014/15 column is two thirds £3.59bn. The years between ramp down to this level.

What I expected from an IA document was the proof that "administration" could be cut by one third. I expected to see international comparisons, comparisons with the NHS in the past, comparisons with other services that commission services (like, for example, social care). I wanted some figures that said "if we run NHS commissioning like these other guys do, we will save this amount of money". There was no such statement. Instead, we get a table that says "if we cut administration funding by one third the costs of administration will fall to two thirds". Pathetic.

The huge damage that is being wrought on the NHS at the moment is being justified with pathetic documents like this. In the future people will ask "how did you allow this to happen to the NHS?" They will also ask "and on such flimsy proof?".

Thursday, 8 September 2011

Objections

Read this:
  1. the removal of all references to promoting competition whether directly or indirectly. 
  2. any duty to promote choice being made subsidiary to duties to promote fair access, equality of outcomes, and integrated services. 
  3. the removal of the facility for transferring NHS assets, including land, to third party providers. 
  4. retaining the cap on Private Patient Income by NHS Foundation trusts. 
  5. the restoration of the duty of the Secretary of State to provide or secure the provision of, healthcare services, and the reinstatement of the power of the Secretary of State to delegate his functions to NHS commissioners and to direct them as necessary. 
  6. the retention of the ability of the local authority overview and scrutiny function to refer significant services changes to the Secretary of State for adjudication. 
  7. providing that Health and Well-being Boards (HWBs) have a majority of elected members and are able refer unresolved disputes with local commissioners to the Secretary of State rather than to a national qango. 
  8. the explicit prohibition of the wholesale outsourcing of commissioning work to private companies. 
  9. guaranteeing that commissioning groups are fully co-terminous with social services local authorities, except where HWBs and local authorities agree otherwise, and are funded solely on the basis of the health needs of the population. 
  10. the removal of the power to pay financial incentives to practitioners as a means of influencing their referral behaviour. 
  11. rejection of any personal health budget scheme which allow users to spend NHS funds on private health insurance or as a top up towards private health care or to buy services or treatments judged too ineffective or inefficient for the NHS to buy. 
  12. the inclusion of a duty on all NHS bodies, when arranging with non-NHS bodies to provide services, to avoid any risk of essential NHS services (including teaching and research) being destabilised in an unplanned way through loss of income or case-load 
  13. ensuring Directors of Public Health remain independent sources of expert advice.
Is this Labour's key objections to the Health and Social Care Bill? No. This is the objection from the Social Liberal Democrats Forum (Dr Evan Harris' group).

I tried to find a succinct list from Labour giving their opposition to the Bill, but I couldn't find one.
Labour could be re-elected at the next election on a huge majority if it exposed Lansley's Bill and then campaigned against it. We hear so little from Labour that we do not know if they want the Bill or not. We do not know if Labour wants to be re-elected.

All the talk at the moment is what this Lib Dem peer, or that Lib Dem peer will attempt to amend when the Bill reaches the Lords. Why aren't we hearing the same thing about Labour peers? Is it because the labour working peers are all Blair's chums who couldn't care less?

Labour is the party of the NHS. But if Labour does not raise its game on opposing the Health and Social Care Bill it will lose this title; or worse, it may get the name of the party who failed to raise a finger to protect the NHS.

Meanwhile, if you are a Lib Dem go to the conference and vote for Dr Charles West's motion. If you are Labour then campaign that these 13 points form Labour's objection to the Bill. If you are Conservative then you should be ashamed of your party.

(Updated to get the name of SLF right.)

Wednesday, 7 September 2011

Over to the Lords

So now the Lib Dems have voted. Four brave souls - who clearly value the NHS more than their chance to become a minister - voted against the Bill: Andrew George, Julian Huppert, Greg Mulholland and Adrian Sanders. Ten others could not get off their arses to oppose the bill and took the typical Lib Dem sitting-on-the-fence position of abstaining.

The strategy, so I am informed by Dr Evan Harris, is for the Lords to make the Bill better.

I have a lot of respect for the Lords. My brother is an academic and is an advisor to a Lords Select Committee and as part of this he regularly gives well attended lectures in Westminster. He tells me that the Lords show more enthusiasm for the subject than his soon-to-be-£9k-fee-paying-thanks-to-LibDems students do! I have written that I think this aspect of the Lords - mostly non-political experts - is unique and important and should be preserved. I have suggested that there are ways to remove political patronage that will make it more democratic and keep the experts in the Chamber.

However, the Lib Dem manifesto from last year says:

Liberal Democrats will: Replace the House of Lords with a fully-elected second chamber with considerably fewer members than the current House.
So, they want to create a clone of the House of Commons where all but 14 Lib Dems chose to sign the end of the NHS as we know it. Remember that there is only one scientist in the House of Commons, and that is Dr Julian Huppert, the Lib Dem rebel. There is a smattering of doctors, including Sarah Wollaston who told us there were serious accountability issues in the Bill, yet she still voted for it! The bullying by the political parties (which Wollaston has also written about) clearly keeps the MPs in check.

The chamber that Dr Harris wants to be the saviour of the NHS will be savaged by his party leader's plan to "reform" the Lords. Clegg's bill will reduce the membership of the upper house from 789 to 300, 80% of which would be elected by STV. This will mean that there would be space only for 60.5 experts [300 is about half of 650, so at the current rate of one scientist per 650 elected MPs, that would suggest about half an elected "lord" in the new chamber], a number that would be easily outvoted by the whipped politicians.

Harris puts a lot of confidence in Shirley Williams. I am not sure why. Yes, once she belatedly realised that there was an issue she has opposed the Health Bill, but I have never read anything from her that illustrates that she really understands the dangers. I agree with Roy Lilley, Lord Owen will make the most significant changes and he is likely to destroy any government argument. Harris, showing his political colours, prefers Williams to Owen because, well, Owen is now a crossbencher (not a member of a political party) and is exactly the sort of expert that Clegg wants removed from the House.